In an optimal growth setting, where the only productive asset is a renewable resource which is jointly exploited, it is shown that competitively the resource may be over-used or under-used. The diversion from optimal use arises due to the externality embodied in the jointness of exploitation and would intuit over-use. Surprisingly, under-use has been derived as an equilibrium phenomenon by Dutta and Sundaram [93] when agents strategically interact in a dynamic game. However, as is shown here, strategic interaction is not necessary. The phenomenon of under-use may arise within a perfectly competitive model because the externality pushes implicit resource prices above the optimal when the discount rate is less than natural adjustment.
Introduction
The common property problem has become a tradition in economic analysis. 1 Recently, the common property problem has been interpreted more generally as the joint exploitation of a productive asset by Benhabib and Radner [3] . The jointness relates an inherent externality analogous to that in Lucas' [19] human capital formation, the asset formation by owners and unionized workers in
Lancaster [16] , and the R&D process of Shell [24] . We develop a model where competitive agents jointly exploit the sole productive asset which is subjet to some endogenous regeneration. We consider how the asset is produced as well as how it is ''harnessed''drawing from a model by Deacon [8] . In this model complex behavior arises in the form of complicated dynamics and multiple equilibria. Conditions under which the ''tragedy of the commons'' is nonexistent are given in a result paralleling that of Dutta and Sundaram [11] . Both types of results shed light on the nature of inefficiencies due to joint exploitation.
In comparison to the growing literature on dynamic games of joint exploitation, we will maintain several distinctions. 2 First, we assume that agents are infinitesimal so that they rationally ignore any effects their actions may have on the asset stock. We are considering the perfectly competitive complement to the market power wielded by a countable number of agents. Second, we posit a real cost to harness (obtain/use) the asset. While the first assumption is rather implausible (although agents are often assumed to behave as if they do not affect the asset stock), it greatly simplifies the analysis by allowing us to solve the agent's problem myopically in our deterministic model and will thusly allow us to focus on welfare implications. Although this assumption stands in contrast to the small number of agents in dynamic games, it maintains through its myopia implication the ''memoryless'' nature of Markovian strategies often imposed on agents in dynamic games. The second assumption has been discussed in [3] and [22] as a natural extension. Its importance here is to induce competitive agents to choose on the interior of their consumption sets and thus enable the no tragedy result. Finally, we generalize both the production function and dyanmic governing asset evolution.
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Classic references include Gordon [13] , Hardin [14] , Clark, Clarke, and Munro [5] , and Andersen [1] on Jens Warming's(1911) early contribution 2 Indicative ofthisliterature areClemhout and Wan [6] , Benhabiband Radner [3] ,Dutta andSundaram [11] , Dockner and Sorger [10] , Levarhi and Mirman [18] , and Sorger [25] . Sethi and Somanathan [23] use evolutionary game theory to study the sustainability of cooperative equilibria but abstract from welfare effects. Section 2 defines precisely a growth economy with joint exploitation of a productive asset. Section 3 presents the results and several illustrative examples. Section 4 concludes and some proofs and algebra are relegated to the Appendices.
The Model
Consider an economy made up of many small households with individual technologies to produce a consumption good using a commonly held productive asset. Leisure is endowed and taken to be the numeraire good. Leisure may be used either to harness the asset or simply consumed. If used in harnessing, leisure enters as an input into a technology for obtaining the asset. Each household takes the actions of other households as given and rationally assumes its own effect on depletion of the available asset stock is zero. We also assume agents have perfect information and that there is no market for the asset. The objective of each household is to maximize their utility from consuming the good and leisure over an infinite horizon given a particular trajectory for the asset stock. 3 More formally, consider an interval of time t ∈ [0, ∞) in which a measure one of household units, with names corresponding to the Borel sets on the unit interval [0, 1], operate. We could pose the model in discrete time without affecting the analysis at the household level but will generally refer to the continuous time model unless otherwise specified. Each household i s instantaneous utilitymay becharacterized as W i : 2 + → with W i (f i , x i ) = V i (f i )+x i where V i : + → and f i : + → + with f i = f i (z i ), where time subscripts are omitted for convenience. We interpret f i as consumption good (food) output which is a function of asset usage, z i , and x i as the consumption of leisure. Leisure has two uses, to consume and to use for harnessing the asset which we denote as e i . Thus the household's leisure constraint each instant is x i + e i = X i , where X i denotes time endowment and may be thought of as wealth. We make further assumptions that V i and f i are increasing, concave, and C 2 on their domains. The assumption of quasi-linearity in the numeraire leisure along with the assumptions of Appendix II allow us to derive a normative representative agent. The utility function for a representative household becomes W = V i (f i ) + x i or W = U (z) + x where U (z) = V i (f i ) and x = x i where the integrals are taken with respect to the Lebesgue measure on theBorel sigmaalgebra on theunit interval. Wealso assume that U : + →
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The assumption of infinitesimal households amounts to behavior as takers of the given stock level. The analysis is not significantly affected if we separate households into consumers and producers (harnessers) of the resource. is increasing, concave, and C 2 on its domain. 4 The representative household is endowed with X = X i units of leisure at each instant and has leisure constraint X = x i + e i = x + e.
The asset stock available at any given instant is S. This stock is naturally augmented through growth, denoted G, and is depleted by harnessing, denoted z. Generally, we allow G to depend on S and write G (S), G : + → and G ∈ C 2 . The dynamic governing S is described aṡ
where g (0) = 0, g (x) < 0 ∀x > 0, and g (x) > 0 ∀x < 0. If the asset's natural growth is not equal to the level of harnessing then the stock measure will be changing,Ṡ = 0. In a steady state,Ṡ = 0 which implies that z = G (S). It necessarily holds that harnessing would equal growth in a steady state. We further assume that g ∈ C 2 and note that the assumptions above will restrict g (0) ≤ 0. For simplicity, we additionally maintain that g (0) < 0 allowing us to consider dynamics such as g (·) = φ (z − G (S)) where φ < 0, which admits as a special case (φ = −1) the form assumed throughout the literature. If S is assumed to be uniformly accessible and to automatically redistribute itself after harnessing then the above form with φ = −1 could approximate the stock dynamics well. Allowing for the more general dynamic enables us to capture thus far non-modelled aspects of the stock of the asset. With such generality the measure of stock takes on the status of accessibility indicator. 5 Under such a possibility g may be non-linear and perhaps even non-monotone. 6 Two inputs are needed to harness the asset. First, there is the time required for harnessing and second, there must exist a stock of the asset. Households have a harnessing technology described below which uses labor as an input. As the stock declines the cost of exploiting it increases. The representative household's production function for harnessing is 4 Details of the derivation of the normative representative agent are relegated to Appendix II. The methodology utilized follows Mas-Colell et. al. [20] , p. 119, but requires some stronger assumptions. Forinstance, twoeconomies with identical physical levelsofassets may havequitedifferent accessibilityindicators if one economy's assets are relatively easy to exploit (well-developed roads into forests, extensive public education, enforced labor and patent laws). Non-linearity may be due to uneven accessibility across a given level of physical asset. A fully urban economy may have a fairly even accessibility to its human capital but an economy with a large rural population may encounter severe difficulty in accessing human capital beyond its urban centers. Non-monotonicity in the dynamic can capture the possibility that harnessing the asset has positive or negative side-effects on accessibility such as when roads and universities are built, or laws and norms are established.
where h (e, S) = h i (e i , S) where h i :
, and h i is increasing and strictly concave in (e, S) ∀i. We interpret z as the quantity of asset that may be harnessed using e units of labor taking the stock level, S , as given. Assume that h (0, S) = 0 ∀S, h (e, 0) = 0 ∀e , h ∈ C 2 , and that h is strictly increasing and concave on its domain. We also place some Inada-type
With this structure, the representative household takes S as given and utilizes harnessing time, e, to minimize the time cost of obtaining asset level, z. Because the function h (e, S) was assumed to be increasing in e, the solution (cost) function for the asset is readily obtained as h −1 (z, S), where
11 (z, S) > 0 by the inverse function rule where h 1 and h 11 indicate first and second derivatives with respect to the function's first argument respectively.
Assume also that lim
We may now write the representative household's utility function as
This equation shows that total utility is just the sum of the utility derived from consuming food plus the consumption of leisure that is not utilized in harnessing the asset. Choosing z to maximize welfare over an infinite horizon subject to (1) gives (z where z = h (X, S) < ∞ ∀S, is a finite upper-bound on the level of asset used each instant.
The first order condition for an interior solution is U (z) = h −1 1 (z, S). Each household will set the marginal utility of harnessing asset (the LHS of the equation) equal to the marginal cost they incur which indicates the implicit price of the asset (the RHS of the equation). The second order
11 (z, S) < 0, is maintained since U is concave and h −1 is strictly convex. Let us denote z i (S) as the unique solution to the first order condition. It is unique because U is weakly decreasing in z while h −1 is strictly increasing. The lower-bound on z is not binding because lim
Furthermore, the upper-bound on z will not bind, because h 1 (X, S) = 0
1 (z, S) = ∞, so that the time cost of a marginal unit of the asset becomes infinite as the agent spends all available time in harnessing. Thus, we have guaranteed a unique interior solution to (AP). 7 When solving (AP), the representative household will take S as given and S will fluctuate according to (1) . With this, a notion of steady state equilibrium can be defined assuming competitive harnessing and that the boundary value problem of (1) with S 0 given has a unique solution.
Definition 1 A Competitive Steady State Equilibrium (CSSE) is a level of harnessing z c that solves the representative household's problem (AP) taking S as given, and a level of stock S c such that z c = G (S c ) and S c is a locally stable steady state of (2.1). We denote G (S c ) = G c .
With this definition, the model may display no equilibria, a unique equilibrium, or multiple equilibria. The dynamics for S when the system starts from an arbitrary initial point may exhibit convergence, divergence, cycles, or even chaotic trajectories. If a CSSE exists then the solution for S c is implicitly defined by
In order to facilitate analysis of the dynamics of the model we make the following definition. In defining a competitive path, we make no assumptions about stability or even require the existence of a steady state for (1) . A CP simply describes the dynamics of the economy when agents act competitively and the evolution of the asset is governed by (1) . In particular, a CSSE infinitely repeated is a CP, however, a CP need not converge and thus does not necessarily lead to a CSSE. With this definition of dynamic equilibrium and an optimal path as described in Appendices I and III we can define some notions of tragedy which are analogous to those in [11] . When the economy exhibits global stability and uniqueness in both competitive and optimal solutions, checking these definitions amounts to comparing the stock level in the CSSE and that in the optimal steady state. However, more general scenarios are included such as when competitive and optimal stock levels do not converge but are bounded away from each other.
Results
Because of the generality of the model, at this point, we are not able to fully characterize the set of equilibria. It will be of use, however, to establish the following existence result.
Proof. Since z c is non-decreasing and continuous on 0,S , G is strictly decreasing on S m ,S with G S = 0, and . We know that as the discount rate, i, gets large, the optimal steady state will converge to the CSSE. By appropriately choosing i we force s * < 1.3101 . In fact, for i ≥ 20 we find s * < 1.2693 . Thus, although the economy exibits a single optimal steady state above the unique CSSE, a tragedy may not occur as for any initial state leading to the 2-cycle, lim sup
Economists have previously considered the possibility of complicated dynamics in growth models. 10 We simply emphasize such a possibility in the joint exploitation setting especially in comparison to the very well behaved scenario described in Example 1 (and Prop. A.2, Appendix IV). With such complicated dynamics we would not expect agents to effectively learn or make predictions
where r ∈ (0, 4) and K > 0 are exogenous, K > z − G (S), S < K, and h (e, S) = e δ1 S δ2 with δ 1 = δ 2 = 1/2 so that h −1 (z, S) = z 2 S −1 . Further assume, G (S) = 3S/2. Then z c = S/2 and g (·) = rS (1 − S/K) which is the familiar logistic function. For an arbitrary initial stock level we may observe, divergence, cycles of arbitrary length, or chaotic trajectories along any CP. A standard reference is Devaney [9] . If we insist on a continuous time model then this one-dimensional system cannot display chaotic dynamics. While discrete versus continuous time specification does not affect steady state analysis, it can affect the dynamics of the model.
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See Benhabib [2] on chaos in dynamic equilibria and Mitra [21] on chaos in optimal trajectories. about their environment lending credence to the result that agents act myopically. More importantly, complicated equilibrium dynamics in the form of cycles may lead to a dynamic weakening of the tragedy of the commons. If a unique CSSE exists with lower stock than a unique optimal steady state it may still be the case that a tragedy is not observed due to cycling along the CP which may include periodic points with greater stock levels than optimal.
In general, it is possible for model economies to exhibit multiple CSSE. If we consider a growth function G which exhibits critical depensation then we may construct an example with two CSSE.
The multiplicity is determined wholly by the demand and growth functions and will occur for a wide range of functional forms and parameter values (see Figure 2 ). The form chosen for g affects only the speed of convergence to a CSSE, not the existence of multiplicity, and is thus arbitrary.
The equilibria are characterized as low stock, S c l , and high stock, S c h . In Example 3, welfare in the high stock CSSE is strictly greater than in the low stock CSSE. However, considering an arbitrary initial stock there is no guarantee that converging to the high CSSE is preferrable. We use the term trap in reference to low steady state stock levels only. 
where r > 0, 
where S m = arg max G (S) will exhibit two CSSE (see Figure 3 ).
We now turn to an exploration of the welfare properties of CSSE. The main result states that CSSE are always suboptimal as expected, but whether they exhibit over-use or under-use of the asset depends critically on the relationship between the discount rate used by a social planner to define the optimal solution and the rate at which the dynamic governing asset stock changes in levels of the stock holding harnessing fixed.
Proposition 2 For any economy described as above where there exist unique and globally stable CSSE and optimal steady state stocks, S c and S * , where h −1
This form of growth function is mentioned in Clark [4] p. 23. It exhibits critical depensation.
0 implying G (S * ) > 0 (where r is the discount rate used by a social planner) then S * < S c and no tragedy occurs. In either case,
Proof. We show the no tragedy part, the other holds by a symmetric argument. The proof follows by considering (4) and (.15) which define respectively the CSSE and optimal steady state levels of stock subject to the sufficient conditions in Appendix I. If r + g (0) G (S * ) < 0 then (.15) is above (4) at S * while (.15) and (4) are increasing functions of S by the condition on h
above. Thus the unique steady states must occur with S * < S c . The assumption of global stability ensures that from any S 0 ∈ ++ , S * t → S * and S c t → S c and so the definition of tragedy cannot hold. Of course, the CSSE is still non-optimal since S * = S c and the uniqueness assumption imply that although the competitive path was feasible it was strictly worse than the optimal so
. This result is related to the primary results in Dutta and Sundaram [11] where it is shown in a game theoretic setting that a tragedy may not occur. One may hypothesize that their model in addition to requiring ''memoryless''strategies relies on strategic interaction between agents using the state variable as ''a proxy for history'' and thus ''enables indirect conditioning on history even under Markovian behavior.'' In the present model nonatomistic agents react competitively to state variable observations. Proposition 2 must therefore arrive at its no tragedy possibility for other reasons.
While Dutta and Sundaram consider a neoclassical production function we allow a more general class of growth functions and stock dynamics. However, there is nothing particular contained in the critical condition r + g (0) G (S) < 0, which requires G (S) > 0, that relies on this generality.
The key to enabling a no tragedy result is first to ensure an interior solution competitively. Without an interior competitive equilibrium, there is limited scope for the optimal solution to entail lower steady state stocks (see Appendix V). We ensure an interior solution by requiring a cost imposed on harnessing. In [11] interior equilibria are derived through strategic interaction. Once equilibria are interior, Proposition 2 shows that improper balancing of discount rate and growth rates can cause stock levels to be either above or below optimal. In contrast, the no tragedy result in [11] arises from a kind of ''lock in'' caused by a discontinuity in strategies (demands for the asset as a function of stock levels). 12 Finally, the sufficient conditions for a tragedy to obtain given in [11] (theorem
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This explanation for over accumulation has also been explored in [11] . 4 ) cannot be transferred to our model with harnessing costs since our demands, z , can be both continuously differentiable and increasing in S and Proposition 2 will still hold. 13 Reconsider the condition r < −g (0) G (S * ). The RHS term is the rate of change inṠ as stock varies holding demand constant, which we will call the natural adjustment. We may further develop our intuition for Proposition 2 by relating it to the modified golden rule necessary for an optimal steady state
The condition holds if and only if
It may be necessary to restrict the optimal stock level, S * , so that the marginal benefit of increased consumption is less than the marginal labor cost. This can occur because the resulting higher natural adjustment, due to a higher growth rate, more than compensates for the loss in the rate adjusted ratio of marginal labor savings to marginal net benefits from consumption. But we have already seen that in a CSSE competitive harnessing will force
Competitive agents exploiting a jointly held productive asset may not be able to help themselves from collectively over-accumulating the asset because by balancing current marginal benefits and costs from consumption, they inadvertantly over-value current investment (forcing the first term RHS of (MGR) to positive infinity) ignoring its disproportionate detriment to natural adjustment. Using the concavity assumptions, this implies that competitively, steady-state stock will be higher than optimal, and corresponding asset demand, z (S) , will be lower than optimal.
Finally, the reader may refer to Figure 4 where the difference between optimal and competitive stock levels in steady state is depicted over the range of possible values for r + g (0) G (S). 15 For negative values, natural adjustment is greater than the discount rate and optimality requires more consumption and less investment along a path from the initial stock than under competition. In this region, the optimal adjustment to the implicit price for the asset (the costate variable λ) is negative.
For positive values, natural adjustment is less than the discount rate and optimality requires less
13
Since harnessing costs are absent in [11] we provide a version of our model without such costs in Appendix V. The results there are quite similar to [11] indicating that continuity in demand is almost sufficient to guarantee a tragedy. Examples of the absence of any tragedy when demands exhibit simple jump discontinuities are provided. 
15
This is, of course, subject to some regularity such as uniqueness and stability of the steady states.
consumption and more investment than under competition. Thus, the optimal adjustment to the implicit price for the asset is positive.
We conclude our theoretical analysis with an example of the no tragedy result. 
Conclusions/Extensions
We have considered a growth model with joint exploitation of a productive asset. The model was
shown to exhibit a wide range of dynamics depending on assumptions of functional forms. In a fairly simple and reasonable example we showed that multiplicity of CSSE is a possibility. This stands in contrast to work such as [10] where a unique steady state obtains but is congruent with the multiplicity in [11] . Multiplicity, however, is not necessary to obtain our no tragedy result. We have shown an existence result for steady state equilibria based on standard neoclassical assumptions about production of the asset. This result does not preclude the possibility of multiplicity but stronger assumptions on production will.
Primarily we forward two motivations for a dynamic weakening of the tragedy of the commons.
First, we indicate how cycling in competitive dynamic equilibrium may prevent over-use of the asset. Second, at greater length we discuss the implications of costs associated with obtaining the asset for biasing competitive behavior. The main result shows that when r + g (0) G (S * ) < 0 , no tragedy may occur. In fact, the asset may be under-used competitively. This result is surprising because it obtains despite joint exploitation of a single asset by many competitive agents.
Several extensions to the model can be immediately forwarded. First, if storage of the asset or the consumption good is allowed, then agents will again face an inventory problem. The existence of this new state may affect the implicit price for the asset causing agents to partially internalize the externality. Second, if agents are uncertain about growth of the asset so that dynamic equilibria become rational expectations, risk aversion may drive expected implicit prices up ameliorating the externality in the classical tragedy case, but exacerbating the situation in the no tragedy case.
Finally, we may consider the situation where one or more agents have positive measure (market power). If a single large agent is similar to the representative from the competitive fringe we may expect an outcome closer to optimal than under pure competition. However, with strategic interaction between multiple large agents that may or may not be similar to the competitive fringe the outcome is not clear.
Appendix I
In this appendix a continuous time dynamic optimization model for maximizing discounted welfare over an infinite horizon is developed. The notation here is completely analogous to that of Section 2 where a decentralized approach to equilibrium was utilized. As previously, z and S are functions of time but now a social planner will choose z to maximize the welfare objective
and by inserting the representative agent's utility we obtain
where S 0 is the initial stock and r is the discount rate. The problem (.1, .2) is an infinite horizon autonomous problem to which qualitative aspects of the solution are well-known. I will follow closely Kamien and Schwartz [15] Part II, Section 9 in what follows. The current value Hamiltonian (suppressing time indices) for interior solutions is
where λ is a costate variable (current value).
The necessary conditions to maximize H are 16 
By the Implicit Function Theorem ( H zz < 0 ) we obtain z (S, λ) which can be substituted into (.5) and (.6) to obtain two nonlinear first order differential equations in (S, λ) . Suppose a steady state to this system exists S ,λ then its stability properties may be derived by considering the linear terms of the Taylor series expansion about S ,λ . Doing so we obtaiṅ
where
and
The condition required for S ,λ to be a saddle point is
Since b > 0 (.12) will be satisfied if H is concave in (S, z) so that c > 0 and the discount factor r is ''small enough'', or if c > 0 and a < 0 ( which holds if G < 0 and H zS > 0 ). Without making further assumptions on functional forms we can say little more than zero or more steady states will exist and they will be either saddle points or unstable. If a saddle point exists and an appropriate λ (0) can be chosen from a given initial stock S 0 , then the resulting evolution for S and λ are optimal and we will denote such a solution to (.1) and (.2) as (S * t , λ * t ) → S ,λ . The optimal policy is thus defined according to the implicit function z (S, λ), given the evolution of state and costate. We denote the optimal policy z * t (S * t , λ * t ) . Analyzing the steady state whereλ = 0 andṠ = 0 implying z = G (S) we obtain
The necessary conditions evaluated at a steady state in stock, S * are
The optimal stock level in steady state exhibits the quality that lim r→∞ S * = S c , which is obviated by reconsidering equation (2.4) and noting that the limit of (.15) as r goes to infinity is precisely (2.4). As the discount rate goes to infinity, the optimal steady state stock level will converge to the CSSE level. Alternatively, as the difference between the discount rate and the natural adjustment gets large in absolute value, the optimal steady state stock level will not be much different than the CSSE level.
Without any further analysis, we can briefly mention that the steady states for this autonomous infinite-horizon problem will either be unstable or saddle paths and because we have just one state variable S , the optimal path for the state will be monotone (increasing or decreasing from S 0 ).
This follows directly from Theorem 9.5.1 (p. 294) in Leonard and Van Long [17] .
If we reconsider equation (.15) we may derive a modified golden rule as is often done in the optimal growth literature. In our model this rule becomes
Recall that g < 0 and we derive
which leads to further interpretation of the no tragedy result discussed in the paper. It is optimal in steady state to set the discount rate equal to the natural adjustment plus the ratio of marginal labor savings due to changes in S to marginal net benefits due to increased steady state harnessing, weighted by the natural adjustment. 17 
Notes on Sufficiency
Since U (·) is concave, h (·) is concave, and h −1 (·) is convex, the objective function of the social planner's problem is concave. The constraint involving g is not generally concave. Considering the Hessian of g in (S, z)
Generally, since g < 0 we can guarantee that H g is NSD if we assume g ≤ 0 and G ≤ 0.
Or we can guarantee that H g is ND by assuming g < 0 and G < 0. These together imply that where S (t) is any admissible path. As a reference see Theorem 9.3.1 and Corollary 9.3.2 (p.
288-9) in Leonard and Van Long [17] .
Appendix II
Normative Representative Agent
By simply rephrasing the model we derive precisely as in Mas-Colell et al. [20] that since the indirect utility of every agent in the economy is of the Gorman form we may derive a normative representative agent that is admissible relative to any social welfare function. Replace price with dispersion and wealth with time endowment and we derive indirect utilities of the Gorman form
is a concave function of S. Thus, we are able to derive a representative agent for our model as one with v (S, X) = Ψ i + X. Where the integral and X are as defined in the paper. However, the assumptions we need to be able to write the problem for the representative agent as we have in (AP) are somewhat stronger. We want Ψ = Ψ i to be a concave function of z = z i . For this it is not sufficient that U i be concave for all i and h Consider a sequence of time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} with strictly concave utility and convex labor costs of harnessing as above. Recall X ∈ ++ and requirez t (S t ) = h (X, S t ) ≤ S t ∀S t hold for the maximum harnessing by the representative agent. Further restrict G : + → to be strictly concave and let us consider only production for which there is a maximum sustainable level of stock so that we may limit the state variable to S t ∈ 0,S = S ∀t . For further simplicity assume that g :
→ is linear so that g (z − G (S)) = φ (z − G (S)) with φ < 0 as was the case for examples above. The dynamic governing stock evolution should now be written as
Several notes here. Since our growth function is net addition to stock, to translate into the framework of Dutta and Sundaram [10] (DS) it is necessary to add S t to G (S t ) and the translation is exact only when φ = −1 . Our dynamic for stock adjustment is more general. Also, we assume that addition to stock and harnessing occur simultaneously during each period. So even if the entire stock available at the beginning of the period is harnessed, if growth is positive, there will be positive stock available next period. This seems to be an innocuous assumption but intraperiod timing actually has immense ramifications for outcomes.
Competitive Solution
The representative agent takes the stock each period as given and chooses a level of harnessing with the goal of maximizing the discounted sum of utility
where W (z t , S t ) = U (z t )−h −1 (z t , S t )+X and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The deterministic setting and infinitesimal size of the representative agent (who rationally ignores any impact on the stock) reduce the problem to a myopic one. Once the competitive demand as a function of stock level is determined, the analogous definitions of CSSE and CP are taken. Stability for any CSSE now requires that the slope of the dynamic in S t be less than 1 in absolute value at the CSSE,
Optimal Solution -Planner's Problem
In this sectionwe follow quite closely theanalysis inStokey, Lucasand Prescott, Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, (SLP) Chapters 4 and 6. The idea is to derive some regularity conditions on the planner's problem as a dynamic program to ensure existence of a solution and to further allow some analysis of stability of the solution through the Euler equation. We begin with some definitions. Note that the following constraint on next period's state, given this period's holds
We define the correspondence of feasibility constraints Γ : S → S as
Furthermore, let A be the graph of Γ
State evolution follows
The sequence problem for the planner is thus
s.t. s t+1 ∈ Γ (s t ) t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
The corresponding functional equation and our focus in the sequel is
where F : A → , F (s, y) = W (z (s, y) , s) . We proceed to establish that solutions to (C. 4) and (C.5) coincide exactly by showing that the problem is one of bounded returns. To do so, we establish a sequence of lemmata.
Lemma 1 S is a convex subset of , and the correspondence Γ : S → S is nonempty, compactvalued, and continuous.
Proof. S = 0,S is obviously convex.z = h (X, s) is strictly increasing in s and since φ < 0 Proof. z (s, y) = φ −1 (y − s) + G (s) is continuous and thus by assumptions of smoothness on U and h , F (s, y) = U (z (s, y)) − h −1 (z (s, y) , s) + X is also continuous by composition and addition of continuous functions. Further, z (s, y) ≤S ⇒ U (z (s, y)) ≤ U S < ∞ and
A by assumption and X ∈ ++ . Altogether, |F (s, y)| < ∞ and there exists a bound B ∈ ++ such that |F (s, y)| < B ∀ (s, y) ∈ A.
β ∈ (0, 1) simply by assumption.
Given a solution to (C.5) v ∈ C (S) we define the policy correspondence P : S → S by
Next, define the operator T on C (S) as
We are now in a position to utilize Theorem (4.6) in SLP which guarantees the existence of a unique fixed point, v, for T, an algorithm for computing v since T is a contraction, and that the policy correspondence P is compact-valued and u.h.c.
We have guaranteed the existence of a solution to the planner's problem but are unable to discern much about it at this point. Further lemmata to guarantee differentiability of the solution (value function) willallow us totake an Euler equation approach and characterize, at least locally, solutions about steady states.
Lemma 3 F is strictly concave in (s, y) .
Proof. The functions U (·) and −h −1 (·, ·) are strictly concave by assumption. Also, z (s, y) =
is concave by the assumption that G is concave. By composition, U (z (s, y)) and h −1 (z (s, y) , s) are strictly concave in (s, y) and thus F is strictly concave in (s, y) .
We make the following assumption as a technicality to establish the next lemma. It roughly requires that h be ''more concave'' than G when maximum effort is devoted to harnessing. Assume that
∀ s, s ∈ S , where s θ = θs + (1 − θ) s .
Lemma 4 Γ is convex in the sense that for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and s, s ∈ S y ∈ Γ (s) and y ∈ Γ (s ) ⇒
Proof. It is clear that y θ = θy + (1 − θ) y must be contained as follows by taking convex combinations of upper and lower bounds of Γ (s) and Γ (s )
, the assumption (C.8) and concavity of G guarantee y θ ∈ Γ (s θ ) .
Lemma 5 F : A → is twice continuously differentiable on the interior of A.
Since z ∈ C 2 by the assumption on G and since U and h −1 are C 2 as well. F is therefore C 2 on the interior of A.
With these additional lemmas we are able to say more about solutions to (C.5). Without precisely stating them, we conclude from theorems 4.8 and 4.11 in SLP that the value function v is strictly concave and P is a continuous, single-valued function. We also conclude that if s 0 ∈ intS and
the theorem of Boldrin and Montrucchio (SLP Theorem 6.1) we can conclude that without further assumptions, it is not possible to put further restrictions on the policy function. For any C 2 function p : S → S there exists a return function and discount factor so that (S, Γ, F, β) satisfy lemmas C1-C5 such that p is the optimal policy function for the dynamic program. We turn next to study some stability properties of solutions to (C.5).
Under conditions such as lemmas (C1)-(C5) sufficient conditions for an interior solution to the sequence problem (C.4) are the Euler equations and the transversality condition
Condition (C.10) will hold if we consider solutions that are convergent to a steady state of (C.9) since s t is bounded ∀t and β ∈ (0, 1) . We may rewrite (C.9) as a system of two first order difference equations by defining Z t = (z t+1 , z t ) ∈ 2 and transforming (C.9) into
where M is a 2 × 2 matrix and J = −β
sy (F yy + βF ss ) and K = −β −1 . Since the system is nonlinear we look for steady states and then rely on the following local stability result (SLP theorem 6.9)
Theorem 1 Let (S, Γ, F, β) satisfy lemmas C1-C5 and lets be an interior steady state of (C.9). Let F ss , F sy , and F yy denote the second derivatives of F evaluated at (s,s) and assume that F sy + F yy + βF ss + βF sy and F sy are nonzero. Define the matrix M as in (C.11) and assume that M has an eigenvalue less than one in absolute value. Then there is a neighborhood N ofs such that if s 0 ∈ N , the unique solution {s t } to (C.4) satisfies lim t→∞ s t =s .
Proof. This is a special case of SLP Theorem 6.9 (p. 153).
Modified Golden Rule
We mayutilize thefirst-order conditions and the envelopecondition from (C.5) or theEuler equation (C.9) evaluated at an optimal steady state stock level S * to obtain a modified golden rule analogous to Appendix I's (.16) in continuous time. If we write the discount factor, β, as β = 1/ (1 + i) where i is the discrete analog of the discount rate and note that g −1 (0) = 1/g (0) by the inverse function rule, we derive the following
Recall that g (0) < 0 and we derive
This is identical to (.16 N ,s N is a steady state of (C.9) ands N < s c . We can show for this example that there exists a no tragedy optimal steady state for all α ∈ (0, 1/2) and β ∈ (0, 1) while for α ∈ [1/2, 1) there may or may not be a β ∈ (0, 1) such that a no tragedy optimal steady state exists. In particular, if α = 1/3 and β = 9/10 then s The above example shows that the absence of any tragedy may be an equilibrium phenomenon arising as the economy approaches a competitive steady state. λ = 0 would require U (G (S)) = 0 from (A.13) which is not possible since U > 0. Thus it is necessary that r + g (0) G (S) = 0 and λ > 0 at an interior steady state solution. We may derive a modified golden rule as before
It is optimal in an interior steady state to set the discount rate equal to the natural adjustment.
Note that r > 0 and thus in optimal steady state we must have G (S * ) > 0 which differs from the model with harnessing costs. We may now ask whether a tragedy must occur in this modified model and the answer is a qualified yes.
Proof. From S 0 > 0 the lowest attainable steady state stock level is the unique fixed point of G (S) on 0,S if one exists otherwise it is zero. Any lower steady state would require z >z = S which is not feasible. Note that the unique CSSE is precisely at this lowest stock level, z c =z and
. This in conjunction with the monotonicity of the optimal state evolution guarantee that lim sup t→∞ S c t < lim sup t→∞ S * t from any S 0 > 0 and thus a tragedy occurs. Even if we broaden the assumptions on growth to allow some nonconvexities, such as with depensatory growth, a result as above will obtain as on each basin of attraction for each CSSE, the planner is not able to sustain steady state stocks below the competitive levels. These conclusions are not terribly surprising. If competitive behavior results in maximal harnessing of the asset then a tragedy is likely to obtain. The question still remains in this setting whether or not competitive paths are optimal (is maximal harnessing optimal under some parameterizations?) and whether or not stocks may spend substantial time above the optimal during convergence to any steady state. Other, weaker, notions of tragedy may be relevant in the dynamic context. The following proposition generalizes the one above.
Proposition 6 Suppose G (S) < 0 ∀S , G (0) = 0 , G S = 0 for someS > 0 ,z (S) is continuous, and that the set C = {s ∈ S :z (s) = G (s)} has at most countable elements, so that the maximal number of CSSE is countable, then a tragedy obtains.
Proof. Sincez (S) is continuous,z (S) and G (S) partition S into the basins of attraction for elements of the set C . Recall that stability is required for a steady state to be a CSSE. Now consider each basin and its unique CSSE. On each basin, stability of the CSSE requiresz (S) < G (S)
∀S < S
c , where S c is the unique CSSE on this basin, alsoz (S) > G (S) ∀S > S c . The optimal policy therefore cannot sustain a steady state stock below S c because it is not feasible. This together with the monotonicity of the state evolution optimally (result discussed in Appendix I) guarantees that lim sup t→∞ S c t < lim sup t→∞ S * t from any S 0 > 0 and thus a tragedy occurs. Can we extend this result to sets C with positive measure? The answer is again a conditional yes, but here we may find examples where the higher-order multiplicity of CSSE leads to a no tragedy result.
Following the golden rule there is a unique optimal steady state at S * = α r+1 1 1−α , where r is again the discount rate. It is clear that for appropriate choices of α , r , S l , and S h , that S * ∈ (S l , S h ) and that there exist no tragedy CSSE. For instance, take α = 1/2 , S l = 1/10 , and S h = 1/4 , then for any r ∈ 0, 5 1/10 − 1 , S * ∈ (1/10, 1/4) .
Examples of no tragedy results as that above are rather unsatisfying however since they involve knife-edge specifications such asz (S) = G (S) over some region. There appears to be little economic justification for such possibilities.
Until now we have limitedz (S) to the family of continuous functions. As such, we have found little evidence supporting any sort of no tragedy results. Taking a cue from DS we may extend our analysis to consider discontinuities in demand,z (S) . In DS such discontinuities occur on the interior of agents' feasible demands, but why they may occur is not clear. Here agents are consuming at the boundary of their feasible sets, but this boundary may be discontinuous. Why this may be so is again unclear, but we will pose some potential explanations below as we find much more evidence for no tragedy results when discontinuities in demand arise.
First consider a discontinuity in demand of the sort employed by DS. That is a single downward jump discontinuity. This leads to multiple competitive steady state equilibria and a no tragedy result for an interval of the state space S in an example by DS. We obtain a similar result here for general functional forms. Consider a discrete time formulation of our model. Assume that for low stock levels, S ∈ 0,Ŝ , production takes place before consumption so we havez (S) = G (S) + S = f (S) . At low stock levels the agents are patient within a period, but then consume their benefits immediately. At higher stock levels, S ∈ Ŝ ,S , production and consumption take place simultaneously so we havez (S) = S ≤ f (S) . At higher stock levels agents are less patient intraperiod, but are more prudent in their consumption. Then economies with low initial stocks are doomed to exhaust the asset and those with relatively high initial stocks will approach a positive steady state. The reader may wish to consult Figure 6 . 2 is asymptotically stable on Ŝ ,S and that there exists a unique stable optimal steady state S * <Ŝ , then for S 0 ∈ 0,Ŝ a tragedy occurs, but for S 0 ∈ Ŝ ,S a tragedy does not occur.
Proof. The proof follows directly by considering the dynamics of the model. The optimal trajectory converges monotonically to S * <Ŝ . For S 0 ∈ 0,Ŝ the CP converges to S c 1 = 0 and thus a tragedy obtains. For S 0 ∈ Ŝ ,S the CP converges toS and thus a tragedy does not obtain.
An alternative simple discontinuity in demand arises if we reverse the logic above so that there is a single upward jump discontinuity inz (S) atŜ . The reader may wish to consult Figure 7 .
Proposition 8 Suppose G (S) < 0 ∀S , G (0) = 0 , G S = 0 for someS > 0 ,z (S) = S , S ∈ 0,Ŝ ,z (S) = G (S) + S , S ∈ Ŝ ,S andŜ <S whereS is the unique positive fixed point of G (S). Then there are no CSSE and any optimal steady state necessarily satisfies S * >Ŝ .
Proof. It follows directly from the nature of demand and growth functions that there is no CSSE and sincez (S) < G (S) ∀S <Ŝ it is not feasible to have S * >Ŝ .
We find from Proposition (A.5) that a simple comparison of steady states will not suffice to obtain a no tragedy result. The dynamics of such an economy, however, lend another construction of a no tragedy result which we summarize in the following example.
Example 7 Let G (S) = S α − S , g (·) = φ (z c (S) − G (S)) , u (z) = ln z ,z (S) = S , S ∈ 0,Ŝ ,z (S) = G (S) + S , S ∈ Ŝ ,S andŜ <S . Specifically, take α = 1/2 ,Ŝ = 0.1 , and φ = −1/4 . The CP then follows the dynamic S t+1 = √ S t /4 + S t /2 S t ∈ [0, 0. In summary, when we take a discrete time version of our model without harnessing costs so that the only difference between DS and our model is that we consider a continuum of agents (the perfectly competitive analog), our results appear quite similar to theirs. Conditionally for continuous demand we find that a tragedy will occur (as in DS theorem 4) but if we allow for discontinuities indemand, we areable toconstruct robust exampleswhere a tragedyneed notobtain.
The discontinuities required in our model take place at the boundary of the representative agent's consumption set and therefore must be motivated differently that the interior discontinuities utilized in DS. The end results are, however, in the same spirit displaying a certain ''lock in'' effect for discontinuous demand or as in Example (A.6) relying on potential cycling in competitive use. 
